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Abstract: This paper investigates the earnings management activities in Chinese listed firms 
and the impact of the split share structure reform (SSSREF). We demonstrate that Chinese 
listed firms exhibited a long-term positive relationship between real and accrual-based 
earnings management activities over the 2002-2011 period. This reflects the environment of 
weak investor protection and lack of effective corporate governance in China. Our results 
also indicate that the SSSREF in China has not fundamentally improved firms’ quality of 
financial information. This may be because ownership concentration remains high. However, 
it is of interest that the reform has created an incentive alignment effect exogenously. We find 
that firms’ use of discretionary accruals was constrained, and they have consequently shifted 
to less detectable and under-scrutinized real earnings activities after the reform. This shift is 
similar to that seen with the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules on firms’ 
earnings behaviours in developed countries where the investor protection environment is 
strong. We suggest firms’ shifting between the accrual and real-based earnings methods is an 
overlooked area for investors to consider in the emerging market context, and may require the 
attention of regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
Extensive research has well documented the positive effect of good corporate governance 
mechanisms on the information environment and quality of earnings. It can constrain 
managerial opportunistic behaviours and the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders, thus mitigating information asymmetry and improving the quality of 
earnings (Armstrong, Balakrishnan, & Cohen, 2012; Beasley, 1996; Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Klein, 2002; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995; Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003) (see section 
2.3 for details).
1
 In the Chinese context, the Chinese stock market has featured a split 
structure, separating firms’ stock into tradable (TS) and non-tradable shares (NTS). Nearly 
two third of the A-shares were non-tradable and typically held by the state to retain control 
over listed firms in the early economic reform period (Li, Wang, Cheung, & Jiang, 2011; Yeh, 
Shu, Lee, & Su, 2009).
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Severe corporate governance issues arose from this split structure as 
a result of a divergence of interests and incentives between controlling NTS principals and 
TS minority shareholders.  
The split share structure reform (SSSREF) has exogenously created an incentive alignment 
effect, which strengthens corporate governance and improves the quantity of corporate 
financial information (see also section 2.1 for more details).
3
 For instance, Liu and Tian 
(2012) indicate that both tunnelling and excess leverage by controlling shareholders with 
excess control rights have been reduced after the SSSREF in China. Beltratti, Bortolotti, and 
Caccavaio (2012) demonstrates a positive stock market reaction upon the announcement of 
the SSSREF as firms’ profitability and returns are expected to increase with the improvement 
in corporate governance. Hou, Kuo, and Lee (2012) also indicate that this incentive alignment 
effect brought by the SSSREF has reduced the incentive for controlling shareholders to 
withhold price-sensitive information and thus effectively improves corporate transparency.  
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However, it might be premature to conclude firms have simultaneously reduced their 
earnings manipulation behaviours even though the reform brought an increasingly wide-
spread availability of information to market participants. We therefore question the previous 
literature that the reform may not fully improve the credibility (quality) of firms’ increasing 
disclosure of financial information by examining the changes in earnings manipulation 
behaviours. Apart from studying both accrual and real-based earnings management activities 
in the Chinese market, we attempt to make a three-fold contribution. Firstly, we study the 
Chinese SSSREF due to its two distinctive settings, an environment of weak investor 
protection and the nature of its regulatory change. In an emerging market context, the 
investor protection environment is often very weak compared to developed countries. For 
example, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) find the development of the relevant Chinese law and 
institutions are far behind that of most countries in the sample used by the substantial 
literature produced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Lopez-
de-Silanes, La Porta, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), particularly in the areas of investor 
protection systems, corporate governance, accounting standards, and quality of government. 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) also point out that investor protection is weak in China due to a 
less developed legal system, market control mechanism and managerial labour market 
together with a concentrated ownership structure and two-tier board structure that affects 
earnings-informativeness.  
In the absence of effective corporate governance and with weak investor protection, we 
would expect an increasing trend of simultaneous use of both accrual and real earnings 
management in Chinese firms. Therefore, there should be a positive relationship between 
these two activities that reflects the distorted earnings quality and indicates firms engaging in 
either accrual or real-based earnings management are likely to also use the other method to 
supplement it at the same time. We also expect our result to differ from those conducted on 
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developed markets. Developed market firms may find it difficult and costly to simultaneously 
increase the use of both approaches as they are constrained by an environment of strong 
investor protection. Previous studies show that there is a substitutive (negative) relationship 
between accrual and real earnings management in developed markets in general (Badertscher, 
2011; Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Ge & Kim, 2013; Zang, 2012).  
With regard to the nature of the SSSREF reform, the SSSREF does not impose direct 
regulatory requirements on financial reporting or information disclosure, as was the case 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Its purpose is to abolish the unique split share structure in Chinese listed firms by converting 
all NTS into TS. Previous to the reform, this split structure often escalated the conflicts of 
shareholders’ interests and induced corporate governance problems, especially given the 
weak minority shareholder protection environment in China, NTS shareholders’ wealth was 
insulated from stock price movement before the reform and consequently the controlling 
shareholders have less incentive to disclose information and to maximise firm performance 
(Liu & Tian, 2012). As the NTS become tradable, the wealth and interests of their holders 
become linked to firms’ stock performance, thus significantly increasing incentive alignment 
between NTS and TS shareholders. More importantly, the reform creates market-based 
incentives for firms to supply information in order to reap the benefits of capital allocation 
from outside investors and minimise their adverse stock pricing. The SSSREF therefore has 
exogenously created an incentive alignment effect, which strengthens corporate governance.  
On the contrary, the SOX and SSSREF are direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting 
rules. The SOX act in the US was promulgated in response to highly publicised accounting 
scandals to improve corporate transparency and the quality of financial reporting (Cohen et 
al., 2008). Similarly, the mandatory IFRS (formerly the IAS) adopted in many European 
countries was introduced with the aims of ensuring comparability of financial reporting, 
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improved corporate transparency and enhancing the quality of financial statements to 
facilitate a lower cost of capital for EU firms (EC16/06/2002).
4
 These regulatory changes in 
the developed country markets are associated with the heightened scrutiny of accounting 
practices as they took place after scandals were publicised or new reporting requirements 
were implemented.
5
 This makes the SSSREF a more exogenous setting than that of IFRS and 
SOX. Cohen et al. (2008) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) have shown that these direct 
regulatory changes in accounting reporting such as SOX and IFRS can constrain accrual 
earnings activities. As a result, firms tend to use less accrual and more real-based earnings 
management methods to avoid detection of accrual-based earnings management.  
We expect that the SSSREF strengthens corporate governance through creating an incentive 
alignment exogenously and in turn creates an impact on earnings management activities.
6
  
We therefore hypothesize that indirect regulatory change such as the SSSREF can lead to a 
shift from accrual to real-based earnings management activities, which are less detectable and 
less scrutinised in China where the investor protection is weak. We have seen such a shift in 
the case of direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules such as SOX and IFRS in 
developed markets with strong investor protection. However, we do not expect this 
exogenous effect to be sufficient to fundamentally improve the quality of financial 
information in China, which would be expected to reduce the level of both accrual and real-
based earnings management simultaneously. This is because ownership concentration 
remains high after the reform, making it possible for controlling shareholders to manipulate 
earnings in order to inflate share prices and camouflage their intentions for expropriation. All 
in all, the aforementioned two unique features, the weak environment for investor protection 
and exogenous setting, allow us to test the effect of the SSSREF on firms’ earnings 
behaviours and draw inferences distinct from previous research based on the SOX and IFRS 
settings, thereby extending the earnings management literature in general.  
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Secondly, we contribute to the literature by studying the relationship between accrual and 
real-based earnings activities in the pre- and post-reform periods. As previous studies 
indicated the reform has improved the quantity of firms’ financial information and incentive 
alignment, it might be expected that Chinese listed firms have reduced their earnings 
management including both accrual and real earnings management. However, such 
conclusions might be premature. Firms may simply change their mix preferences and switch 
from accruals earnings management to real activates, which is less detectable and scrutinised, 
to continue manipulating accounting information in the post reform period.  
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of all Chinese companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2011. To detect accrual-based earnings management 
(AM), we employ a cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991).
7
 To identify real-based 
earnings management (RM), we first estimate abnormal cash flows from operations, 
abnormal production costs and abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses based on the 
work of Roychowdhury (2006). Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Badertscher 
(2011), we then combine these three separate measures into three aggregate proxies to 
capture the total effect of RM. The focus of this research is to understand the earnings 
management behaviours and trend across the pre and post reform periods. In the multivariate 
regressions, we also control for corporate governance and firm specific variables that may 
affect the variations in earnings manipulation activities. 
Our empirical results indicate that firms use both accrual and real-based earnings 
management in the Chinese context. As opposed to the negative relationship discovered by 
previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Cohen et al., 2008; Ge & Kim, 2013; Zang, 2012), our 
results demonstrate there is a long-run positive relationship between real and accrual earnings 
management throughout the sample period. This is consistent with our expectation and 
implies that Chinese listed firms when engaging in either more real or accrual-based earnings 
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management are more likely to also use the other method to supplement it. This can result 
from the lack of effective corporate governance and weak investor protection. Our results 
further confirm our aforementioned expectations and show that Chinese firms shift their 
earnings activities from AM to RM after the SSSREF. This implies that there is an exogenous 
effect of the SSSREF that changes firms’ earnings management behaviours. It has a similar 
effect to direct comprehensive regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules in developed 
countries where investor protection is strong since Cohen et al. (2008) and Ipino and 
Parbonetti (2011) demonstrate there is a shift from AM to RM after the SOX and IFRS.  
However, we find that the SSSREF has not led to a fundamental improvement in the quality 
of financial information since it has not effectively reduced both accrual and real-based 
earnings management. This may be because ownership concentration remains high after the 
reform. The controlling shareholders still retain a large share ownership even though the 
shareholdings of the largest shareholders and state ownership are significantly reduced. In the 
post-reform period, they may be tempted to increase wealth by inflating stock prices as the 
incentive alignment has led the controlling shareholders to focus on stock performance (as we 
explained in the mechanism of the SSSREF). Firms’ operating performance cannot be 
improved overnight; they are more likely to shift the focus of earnings management to less 
detectable real activities in order to manipulate earnings and achieve a desired accounting 
performance in a short period to camouflage their intentions for expropriation. Our results 
suggest that firms choose to switch from AM to RM activities as the costs of manipulating 
accruals increase with the heightened scrutiny by the capital market after the reform. 
Thirdly, this paper yields additional policy implications related to the scope of the reform. 
Previous studies have examined the impact of direct regulatory changes in corporate 
disclosure on firms’ earnings management behaviour such as the passage of the SOX and the 
IFRS adoption (Cohen et al., 2008). We extend the work of Cohen et al. (2008) by 
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hypothesizing that the SSSREF has achieved an indirect exogenous effect on the trend of 
firms’ earnings behaviours in the emerging market. However, despite an increasing 
availability of information, there is room for firms to continue manipulating earnings 
information as firms can switch from accrual to real-based earnings methods. This might be 
an overlooked area that regulators need to be aware of while improving accounting 
information and embarking on further reform for minority shareholder protection. Investors 
also need to consider this issue as an additional risk while making investments in the context 
of emerging markets.    
We also consider the impact of accounting flexibility that may limit firms’ ability to report 
discretionary accruals in our sample period (Barton & Simko, 2002; Wang & D'Souza, 2006; 
Zang, 2012). Our results indicate that a decrease in accounting flexibility induces a higher 
level of RM and reduces the use of discretionary accruals, but the effect of the SSSREF on 
the relationship between AM and RM remains unchanged after controlling for the impact of 
accounting flexibility. Other robustness tests using individual real earnings management 
proxies, boostrapped medium regressions, suspect firm analysis and difference-in-difference 
design provide further support for our overall conjecture that indirect policy measures can 
have an exogenous effect on firms’ earnings behaviours.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. It first provides a brief overview of 
China’s SSSREF, then discusses the link between the reform and earnings management and 
explain how the research hypotheses are raised in light of the current literature in section 2. 
Following this, this paper describes methodology, data sources and summary statistics in 
section 3. We then report our empirical results on the existence of the both RM and AM 
activities in the Chinese context, their relationship and robustness checks in section 4. The 
last section concludes the paper.   
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2. Related literature and hypothesis development  
2.1 China’s Split Share Structure Reform 
Central to China’s economic reform is the corporate privatisation and stock exchange listing 
of formerly state owned enterprises. Due to the gradualist nature of the reform, the 
government retained controlling ownership stakes in the form of non-tradable shares 
immediately after firms’ listing in the 1990s early reform period. Only a minority of the 
shares were issued to domestic individuals and institutional investors and were freely tradable 
in the newly established Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. This two tier stock 
structure did not improve profitability and efficiency and even led to declines in these after 
firms’ listing (Chen, Lee, & Li, 2008; Yu, Du, & Sun, 2006). Therefore, the split share 
structure has emerged as a transitional process for share privatisation.
8
  
The predominance of NTS was recognised by the government as a major impediment to the 
growth and effective functioning of the stock market for two key reasons. First, the market 
for corporate control was nearly absent. Given the high concentration of non-tradable shares 
held by the state, minority shareholders had very little say in firm decision-making even 
though they had the same cash flow and voting rights. They also had to bear the risk of 
agency issues and value expropriation by the majority shareholders, and lacked the 
information required to monitor firms’ operation and the incentive to do so. Managerial 
entrenchment remained pervasive when officials were appointed as firms’ CEOs by the 
controlling shareholder, the state, to represent its interest. Secondly, incentive divergence 
between NTS and TS shareholders became very severe due to the tradability and pricing 
mechanisms of the two types of shares. TS are tradable and priced based on the market. They 
have higher price-earnings ratios than NTS, which cannot be traded on the stock market but 
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can be transferred to other parties to hold with the permission of the state and at a negotiable 
price primarily based on the net asset value. The stock price movement had little impact on 
the value of NTS, and therefore there was very little incentive for controlling NTS 
shareholders to improve firms’ operating performance and to maximise market based TS 
value (Chen, Firth, Xin, & Xu, 2008; Li, et al., 2011).   
In June 2001, the government launched an initiative to reduce government ownership by 
selling state owned NTS directly on the stock markets. It was hoped that when NTS were 
subject to market forces, incentive alignment between TS and NTS shareholders could be 
achieved. This plan however resulted in share prices plummeting by over 30% as TS 
investors were concerned that an increasing supply of shares would decrease the value of 
their shareholdings. The government had to withdraw this plan in October 2002 in response 
to the strong adverse reaction from the holders of tradable shares. In April 2005, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commissions (CSRC) launched a pilot reform in an attempt to end the 
split share structure. Firms were selected in batches to complete a conversion from NTS to 
TS. Different from the initial approach, NTS shareholders were required to pay compensation 
to TS shareholders before their NTS could be traded on the stock markets. Compensation 
proposals made by NTS shareholders needed to be approved by at least two thirds of total 
voting shares and two thirds of TS shareholders who voted at the shareholders’ meeting.  
Several other measures were also introduced to facilitate the implementation of the reform. 
For example, to reduce stock price volatility, share trading was suspended prior to the public 
announcement of the agreed compensation plans. Firms were also allowed to repurchase their 
shares to stabilise stock prices. Additionally, due to the massive rise in share supply after the 
conversion of NTS, a twelve-month “lockup” period for NTS shareholders was imposed to 
ease the possible impact of stock overhang on the holdings of TS shareholders. NTS 
shareholders with more than 5 percent of a firm’s shares were further restricted from trading 
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more than 5 percent and 10 percent of the firm’s total share capital within 12 and 24 months 
respectively. By the end of 2007, 1,254 Chinese listed firms, accounting for 97 percent of the 
A-share market capitalisation, had completed the reform and begun to gradually release their 
NTS (Firth, Lin, & Zou, 2010; Li, et al., 2011).  
 
2.2 Real and accrual based earnings strategies 
The motivations for altering financial information vary from meeting regulatory thresholds 
and analysts’ forecasts, to smoothing managerial compensation and obtaining desirable stock 
valuations in capital markets (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Lo, 
2008). Firms manipulate accruals by exploiting the flexibility of accounting rules to 
temporarily ‘mask’ true firm performance (Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, & Nabar, 2006; Dechow 
& Skinner, 2000). Accruals manipulation is not achieved by altering underlying operating 
activities with direct effect on cash flow, but via the exercise of manager’s discretion and 
judgement regarding accounting choices (Gunny, 2010).  
Extensive research has documented that Chinese listed firms use discretion in the accrual 
accounting process to manage their earnings information. For example, Aharony, Lee, and 
Wong (2000)  report firms manage earnings upwards using discretionary accruals to inflate 
earnings and skew stock market valuations prior to an IPO. The CSRC requires firms to 
report positive earnings (return on equity) for three consecutive years, and Chen and Yuan 
(2004) and Haw, Qi, Wu, and Wu (2005) show the use of discretionary accruals to meet this 
specific regulatory threshold for maintaining listing status, qualifying for IPOs and rights 
issues or avoiding delisting or trading restrictions (special treatment). Similarly, others (Chen, 
et al., 2008; Cheng, Aerts, & Jorissen, 2010; Jian & Wong, 2010; Jiang & Wang, 2008; Liu & 
Lu, 2004; Yu et al., 2006) document that controlling shareholders tunnel resources or prop up 
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earnings in the form of related party transactions, transfer pricing, or corporate loans and 
subsidies from the local governments to beat regulatory benchmarks. 
However, in practice, firms are likely to employ real activities to manipulate earnings in 
addition to accruals. Previous research exclusively relies on aggregate accruals as a proxy to 
measure earnings management in China, as does most empirical research in other contexts 
(Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). Unlike accruals manipulation, real activities manipulation 
departs from normal operational practice and occurs when managers alter the timing or 
structuring of transactions, investment and allocation of resources to boost accounting 
earnings in the current periods (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006). It has a 
direct effect on operating activities and cash flow.  
Roychowdhury (2006) found evidence that firms avoid reporting losses and negative changes 
in earnings by manipulating real activities such as price discounts or lenient credit terms to 
boost sales, overproduction to lower the cost of goods sold per unit, and reduction of 
discretionary expenses. Others reported the use of real-based methods such as alternations of 
shipment schedules or delaying or reducing R&D and advertising spending, securitisation etc. 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Dechow, Myers, & Shakespeare, 2010). The 
survey evidence in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) also indicates extensive use of real 
activities manipulation among financial executives for meeting earnings targets and their 
willingness to do so even at the expense of future firm value. In related research, Gunny 
(2010) further provides empirical evidence that real activities are associated with meeting 
earnings benchmarks and will allow firms engaging in real earnings management to have 
relatively higher subsequent performance.  
The split share ownership structure in China arguably gives entrenched controlling 
shareholders an incentive to manipulate earnings. In particular, the corporate governance and 
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investor protection environment in China are much weaker than that in developed markets 
(Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2007; López-de-Silanes, et al., 1998; La Porta, et al., 1997). 
As described earlier, controlling shareholders generally own NTS which are determined by 
the net asset value. They are interested in raising more capital from IPO or SEO to increase 
the net asset value per share.
9
 They are less concerned with the quality of public accounting 
information as firms’ share price is irrelevant to their wealth (G. Chen, et al., 2008). 
Conversely, minority TS shareholders rely on positive accounting information to invest and 
expect an increase in the market value of their TS shares. Controlling shareholders are 
motivated to overstate reported earnings in order to raise more capital and increase their 
wealth as minority shareholders are induced to pay inflated prices for TS (Fan, Wong, & 
Zhang, 2007). Chinese listed firms with higher debt have been found to be more likely to 
manipulate financial information when issuing new shares, leading to restatement of their 
“correct” earnings in the following years (Chan, Menkveld, & Yang, 2008). Moreover, given 
the highly concentrated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms, the controlling NTS 
shareholders have often gained control rights that exceed their cash flow rights. In such cases, 
firms are more likely to be motivated to adopt less informative accounting practices so as to 
camouflage their expropriation of value from minority TS shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
To our knowledge, there has been minimal research to date addressing either real activities 
manipulation or the dynamic relationship between real and accruals based earnings 
management in the emerging country context with weak investor protection. Building on the 
above work, the first objective of this paper is to examine whether both of the earnings 
management methods are used in Chinese firms and whether there is a positive relationship 
between the two earnings management activities in an environment of weak investor 
protection and the lack of effective corporate governance. This allows us to provide a more 
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complete picture of the trends in earnings management activities during China’s split 
structure reform. Hence, we test the following hypothesis:  
H1: Chinese listed firms exhibit a long term positive relationship between real and accrual-
based earnings management activities 
 
2.3 Earnings management in the Split Share Structure Reform 
Only a few studies have recently considered the dynamic relationship between the real and 
accrual-based earnings management methods. Notably, Cohen et al. (2008) documents that 
after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 following highly publicised accounting 
scandals, firms tended to use less accrual and more real-based earnings management methods 
to avoid detection of accrual based management. Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) also find that 
this tendency in the setting of the mandatory IFRS adoption in countries with strict 
enforcement regimes. A similar trend was reported by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) after firms 
made seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in order to achieve critical earnings benchmarks. 
Likewise, Badertscher (2011) shows that to sustain their overvalued equity, firms 
increasingly use real rather than accrual-based earnings management as the overvaluation 
period progresses. Zang (2012) also concludes that there is a substitutive relationship 
between real and accrual earnings manipulations. While recent literature shows that firms are 
not limited to accrual earnings management and firms in developed markets shift from 
accrual to real-based earnings management after direct regulatory changes in accounting 
reporting rules such as SOX and IFRS, the impact of the indirect and exogenous regulatory 
changes on firms’ choice of real and accrual-based earnings strategies have not yet been fully 
understood in the emerging market context with an environment of weak investor protection.  
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With respect to the key factor constraining earnings management, extensive previous research 
suggests that good corporate governance can limit firms’ opportunistic behaviours, improving 
the information environment and the quality of earnings. For example, several studies use a 
US sample to show that both a greater proportion of independent boards, and higher audit 
committee quality are more effective in preventing financial statement fraud and constraining 
earnings management measured by discretionary accruals (Beasley, 1996; Chang & Sun, 
2009; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). Others show that 
effective boards can discipline top management who pursue aggressive earnings strategies to 
manipulate accruals, thereby reducing possible costly external consequences (Hazarika, 
Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012). Managerial ownership has been found to reduce the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals and to be positively associated with informativeness of earnings 
(Warfield et al., 1995). In countries with high level of ownership concentration such as many 
in East Asia, the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders prevails and results in low 
earnings informativeness (Fan & Wong, 2002). For external corporate governance 
mechanisms, Armstrong et al. (2012) document an improvement in the information 
environment as evident in the decrease of information asymmetry and increased financial 
statement informativeness on the passing of anti-takeover laws, which has an exogenous 
effect on the corporate control market.  
In the Chinese context, Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) show that a higher degree of ownership 
concentration reduces corporate transparency and share price informativeness in listed firms 
with higher state ownership, less foreign ownership and poor auditor quality. They interpret 
their result as supporting the view that good corporate governance improves firms’ 
information environment. Firth et al. (2007) illustrate that both ownership and board structure 
determine the extent that discretionary accruals are opportunistic, thereby affecting the 
quality of firm’s financial information in China. Similarly, Liu and Lu (2007) document that 
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inefficient corporate governance as a result of principal-principal agency conflicts increases 
earnings management in the form of tunnelling. Both Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) and 
Wang and Yung (2011)  also find that listed firms with private controlling ownership 
demonstrate a higher level of accrual based earnings management than state controlled firms, 
since private listed firms face a tougher environment to raise capital and only have minimal 
state support. They are therefore more prone to manipulate accounting information in order to 
report positive earnings.   
Similarly, the SSSREF should reduce earnings management as it creates an incentive 
alignment exogenously and strengthens corporate governance of Chinese listed firms in an 
environment of weak investor protection. As noted in previous research, the reform converted 
NTS into TS, thus linking controlling NTS shareholders’ wealth to firms’ stock performance 
after the reform. The incentive alignment between NTS controlling shareholders and TS 
minority shareholders for profit maximisation was exogenous because the share conversion 
was implemented at full scale in all listed firms (Liu & Tian, 2012). Previous research has 
provided empirical evidence that the SSSREF improved many corporate governance related 
issues such as corporate transparency, external monitoring by outsiders and information 
asymmetry (Hou et al., 2012; Liu & Tian, 2012; Yeh, et al., 2009). Liu and Tian (2012) show 
an improvement in corproate goverance after the SSSREF has reduced both tunnelling and 
excess leverage by controlling shareholders with excess control rights. Beltratti et al. (2012) 
further demonstrate that the Chinese stock market reacted positively to the announcement of 
the SSSREF as investors expected firms’ profitability and returns to increase with an 
anticipated improvement in corporate governance. The work of Hou et al. (2012)  more 
specifically examines the effect of the SSSREF on share price informativeness. They suggest 
the reform improves firms’ incentive alignment exogenously, thereby reducing the incentive 
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for controlling shareholders to withhold price-sensitive information. As such, the reform has 
led to the improvement in the quantity of corporate information. 
However, it might be premature to conclude firms reduce their earnings manipulation 
behaviours (i.e. an improvement in the quality of financial information) even though the 
reform brought an increasingly wide-spread availability of information to market participants 
given the dynamic relationship between real and accrual-based earnings strategies discussed 
earlier. Especially, ownership concentration still remains high after the SSSREF in China, 
making expropriation of minority shareholders possible. It might also be problematic to only 
rely on the magnitude of accruals to understand the fuller picture of earnings management 
activities influenced by the reform. Controlling shareholders may still have the incentive to 
increase their own wealth by inflating stock prices via earnings management activities.
 
They 
can switch and combine real and accrual-based earnings methods to influence firms’ value 
and earnings expectations, distorting earnings quality. Highly concentrated ownership makes 
it possible for them to continue manipulating earnings and disguising their expropriation of 
minority shareholders especially if the dominant shareholders still retain a large share of 
ownership after the reform. Moreover, NTS controlling shareholders have the time to do so 
before being selected to complete the reform and the expiry of the lock-up period, as the 
reform was gradually rolled over to all listed firms.   
Our conjecture is that in the absence of effective corporate governance and with weak 
investor protection, the reform should have reduced accrual-based earnings management 
activities because its incentive alignment effect led to improved corporate governance, an 
increased quantity of firms’ financial information and heightened scrutiny by the capital 
market, all of which increase the cost of using this method. Instead, firms switch to use more 
real activities manipulation, which is less scrutinized and detectable, to continue their 
earnings manipulation. This shift from accrual to real earnings management should be similar 
17 
 
to the effect of direct regulatory changes such as the SOX and IFRS in the developed market 
where investor protection is strong. In light of the above discussion and previous studies, we 
hypothesize:  
H2: After the split share structure reform, Chinese listed firms tended to use less accrual 
and more real-based earnings management methods  
H3: After the split share structure reform, Chinese listed firms shift from accrual to real-
based earnings management  
 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1 Earnings management measurement 
3.1.1 Accrual-based earnings proxy  
We employ discretionary accruals to proxy for accrual-based earnings management following 
previous literature. We first estimate the ‘normal’ or expected level of accruals using the 
cross-sectional Jones model as described by Jones (1991), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), 
and  Cohen and Zarowin (2010):  
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it
it
i t i t i t i t
TA SALES PPE
k k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets

   

                                                       (1) 
where, for each fiscal year t and firm i, TA is the total accruals (earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations less operating cash flows). We estimate the above 
regression for firms within each industry code classified by the CSRC. Assetsi,t-1 represents 
total assets, ΔSALESit is the annual change in sales, 
 itPPE  equals gross property, plant and 
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equipment. We then use the coefficient estimates from equation (1) to calculate the firm-
specific normal accruals ( itNA ) for the sample: 
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆit it
it
i t i t i t
SALES PPE
NA k k k
Assets Assets Assets  

                                                                     (2) 
Discretionary accruals ( itDA ) measured in this paper are the difference between total accruals 
and the fitted normal accruals ( itNA ). 
3.1.2 Real earnings proxies  
Based on previous studies, three individual proxies are identified to measure real earnings 
management. We estimate all proxies with a minimum of 8 observations for each year. 
Following Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998), Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), we first model cash flow from operations (CFO) and express this as a linear 
function of sales and changes in sales in the current year.  
1 1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it
it
i t i t i t i t
CFO Sales Sales
k k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
   

                          (3) 
where CFOit is cash flows from operations taken from the statement of cash flows for firm i  
in year t, Asseti,t-1 
represents total assets at the end of year t-1, Salesi,t is the net sales for firm i 
in year t, and ΔSalesit is firm i’s changes in net sales between year t-1 and year t. εit is the 
error term. The abnormal cash flow from operation equals the actual CFO minus the 
“normal” level of CFO calculated using the estimated coefficient from equation (3) for each 
industry and year. As Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest, 
managers engage in sales manipulation through acceleration of timing of sales using price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms in the current period. The temporarily boosted sales 
volume is likely to diminish in the next fiscal year once the firm reverts to the original prices. 
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Additional sales increase current period total earnings, but result in declines in margin due to 
price discount, lenient credit and higher production costs relative to sales than the ‘normal’ 
level. We therefore expect a lower abnormal CFO (ACFO) in the current period as a result of 
sales manipulation when firms participate in real earnings management according to equation 
(3). 
The second individual proxy is the abnormally high production costs, expressed in the 
regression below: 
, 1
1 1 2 3 4
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 i tit it it
it
i t i t i t i t i t
SalesPROD Sales Sales
k k k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
    

                         (4) 
where PRODit is firm i’s production costs in year t, which equals the sum of the cost of goods 
sold plus change in inventory. All other variables are defined previously. To manage earnings 
upward, firms can overproduce inventory in order to report a high operating margin as the 
fixed cost per unit declines with an increasing volume of production. We expect that a higher  
value of the residual (APROD) estimated from the above equation (4) indicates higher 
manipulation through overproduction.    
The third proxy is abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX), which is estimated using the 
following equation:  
, 1
1 1 2
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1 i tit
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SalesDISX
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 
  
                                                                       (5) 
itDISX equals discretionary expenditures including selling, general and administrative 
expenses, R&D, and advertising for firm i in year t. As discretionary expenditures do not 
normally generate immediate revenues for firms, managers may choose to reduce such 
expenses to boot current earnings. If firms usually pay these expenditures by cash, they might 
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experience a higher cash flow and an abnormal CFO effect in the current period 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). We therefore expect lower abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) 
when real earnings management is involved according to equation (5). 
Finally, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we construct two 
aggregate proxies by summing the above individual proxies to capture the total effects of real 
earnings management.  
Following the previous studies, our first aggregate real management proxy is expressed as: 
_1RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs                      (6) 
We multiply abnormal cash flow from operations by -1, and then add abnormal production 
costs so that a higher level of RM_1 indicates higher levels of real earnings management 
activities. We do not multiply abnormal production costs by -1 as it already implies higher 
levels of real activities.  
The second aggregate measure is given as:
 
_ 2RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal discretionary expenses            (7) 
We multiply abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by -1 
and sum them both. The larger value of RM_2 suggests a greater use of sales manipulations 
and a reduction in discretionary expenses to manager earnings.  
Following Cohen et al. (2008), we construct the third aggregate measure, RM_3, and it is 
given as:  
_ 3RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs
abnormal discretionary expenses
  
                   (8)
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Following Cohen et al. (2008) and Badertscher (2011), we view RM and AM as distinct to 
each other. The larger value of RM_3 suggests a greater use of RM to manage earnings.   
 
3.2 Regression models  
We estimate the following two regressions to test the impact of the reform on both earnings 
methods individually and their relationship over time. We first model a firm’s decision to 
engage in accrual-based earnings management activities as the regression below: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17
_ _
1 4
_ _
DA SSSREF RM PROXY SSSREF RM PROXY DUALITY BIND
PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
     
     
      
     
              (9)
 
where the dependent variable, DA, is the discretionary accruals (DA). RM_PROXY is equal to 
either three individual real earnings proxies (ACFO, APROD and ADISX) or the three 
aggregate RM proxies. The indicator variable is SSSREF equal to 1 for the period 
commencing a year after a listed firm was chosen to complete the SSSREF, 0 otherwise.  
We also test real based earnings manipulation by the following regression: 
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17
_
1 4
_ _
RM PROXY SSSREF DA SSSREF DA DUALITY BIND
PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
     
     
      
     
                        (10)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
where RM_PROXY is the individual and aggregate RM proxies, and DA*SSSREF is the 
interaction variable between DA and SSSREF. RM_PROXY (DA) and RM_PROXY*SSSREF 
(DA*SSSREF) capture the long term relationship between the two earnings strategies and the 
change in their relationship after the reform. For testing the positive relationship between 
these two earnings management strategies, we expect to find a positive RM_PROXY (DA) 
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coefficient. If firms switch from one method to another in the post-reform period, we expect 
to observe a negative coefficient on the interactive terms in the equation (9) and (10).  
The focus of this study is the effect of the split structure reform on Chinese listed firms’ 
earnings behaviours. In both equations (9) and (10), we control for a number of corporate 
governance related and firm specific variables, some of which have been proved to have 
explanatory power for the choice of earnings management strategies. As discussed earlier, 
manipulation of accounting information can be more difficult for the controlling shareholders 
if the firm has effective corporate governance in place (Fan et al., 2007; Liu & Lu, 2004). 
Top executives have been found to be more prone to boost earnings information in order to 
avoid losses and smooth earnings (Warfield et al., 1995). We include CEO and top 
management compensation variables as they are based on firms’ reported earnings in China 
(Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006). We use PAY as a proxy, which is the natural logarithm of the total 
cash compensation received by the top three executives. We do not include option based 
compensations as they are uncommon in the Chinese context (Aharony et al., 2000) 
Following Firth et al. (2007), we also control for CEO duality as managers taking both CEO 
and the board chairman positions can reduce the monitoring role of the board and increase the 
possibility for earnings management. Board independence and external audits by the Big 4 
auditors are perceived to reduce controlling shareholder’s earnings manipulation, and 
improve corporate transparency and accounting quality (Gul et al., 2010; Klein, 2002). BIG4 
is the dummy variable set to 1 if the annual report is audited by the Big 4 auditors or their 
joint ventures and 0 otherwise. Board independence is the ratio of independent directors on 
the board. 
To account for the effect of ownership concentration, we include TOP1, the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholder.
10
 Controlling NTS shareholders might have the 
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incentive to increase earnings per share in order to maximise their wealth before their NTS 
become tradable. The cost of doing so depends on the number of tradable shares. To capture 
this manipulation effect on earnings strategies, we include TS in a similar fashion to Zang 
(2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) who control for outstanding shares. It represents the 
natural logarithm of the number of firms’ total tradable shares. The type of ownership also 
has effects on earnings management. State owned enterprises are found to have less incentive 
than private firms to manipulate accruals due to state subsidies (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 
2010; Ding et al., 2007). We include STATE as a dummy variable coded 1 if the largest 
shareholder is the government and 0 otherwise. Chinese firms are also more likely to engage 
in earnings management in  the event of IPOs or during the procedure of removing the 
Special Treatment status (Aharony et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2010). We include indicator 
variables IPO_DUM and ST_DUM respectively if the firms engage in such activities. The 
detailed definitions of variables employed in the regressions are reported in appendix A. 
We also control the following variables for firms’ variations in size, capital structure, and 
performance that might affect earnings management following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
Fan et al. (2007) and Firth et al. (2007). Large established firms might find it very costly to 
manipulate earnings as they face more scrutiny by regulators and auditors than small rapidly 
growing firms whose business activities are hard to observe. FIRMSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets at the end of each fiscal year, LEVERAGE has been found to 
affecting the earnings response coefficient and is defined as the total debt divided by total 
assets, and BM is the book to market ratio to control for firms’ growth rate. TOBINQ is the 
proxy for investment opportunities and is the market value of assets divided by reproduction 
cost. Firms’ profitability is measured by ROA. We also include industry dummies based on 
the CSRC classification to control for the impact of market wide performance. We report t-
statistics computed by firm clustering standard errors.  
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3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Our analysis is based on the annual financial and accounting information of Chinese listed 
companies extracted from the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
The sample period spans 1998 to 2011. Although published cash flow statements have 
become compulsory for all Chinese listed firms since 1998, we require sales in t-2 and assets 
in t-1 year to calculate the real and accruals earnings management proxies, so these variables 
are included from 2000.  We also restrict our sample to all non-financial firms with at least 8 
observations in each CSRC industrial code grouping per year.
11
 Our final sample period is 
from 2002 to 2011 for the regression analyses since controlled corporate governance 
variables become increasingly available from 2002 in the CSMAR database. After excluding 
firms with missing data for control variables and calculating the discretionary accruals, we 
identify 13,840 firm-year observations. Our observations for RM_1(3) and RM_2 are 12,610 
and 13,602 observations respectively due to the data requirements to calculate them.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our final sample in the period 2002-2011. Panel 
A reports the sample distribution of firm years from 2002 to 2011. The number of firms has 
increased steadily from 2002 to 2011, reflecting the rapid growth of China’s capital market. 
Panel B provides the summary statistics of various accounting and financial variables of the 
sample firms. Despite the differences in the sample period, the median and means of most 
variables are broadly similar to those reported by Gul et al. (2010), Hou et al. (2012) and 
Firth et al. (2007). The mean ROE is 0.036 with a standard deviation of 0.596. 
Approximately 7% of firms use one of the international Big4 auditors or their joint ventures. 
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The mean and median values of book-to-market (BM) ratio are very close, accounting for 
0.377 and 0.388 respectively.  
As expected, on average the largest shareholder owns 38% of a firm’s shares, and this 
confirms that the ownership structure is very concentrated in the Chinese listed firms 
compared to developed markets. The percentage is slightly lower than the figures of 41.9% 
and 42.8% reported by Ding et al. (2007) and Gul et al. (2010) respectively. This may be due 
to the differences in the sample periods and also reflects the decline in shares held by the 
controlling shareholders as they sell their NTS after the reform.
12
  The mean of STATE in the 
sample is 47.9%. This figure reveals that the state as the largest shareholders continues to 
play an important role in Chinese listed companies. Most importantly, Panel B also shows the 
descriptive statistics for our earnings management measures across quartiles. For the 
discretionary accruals, the mean value is 0.001, close to 0.002 as reported by Firth et al. 
(2007). Its median is 0.003, slightly higher than the mean. For the three individual RM 
proxies, the average of APROD is negative with a zero median in our sample. ADISX has a 
negative median and the largest magnitude among the three individual RM proxies. The 
median of the three aggregate real proxies are all positive and equal to 0.013.  
Table 2 presents the matrix of Pearson pair wise correlations between the variables in the 
main tests in the period of 2002-2011. As expected, RM and DA are highly and positively 
correlated with each other. The correlations between DA and RM_2 and between DA and 
RM_3 are 0.492 and 0.309 respectively. These positive correlations indicate that firms use 
both real and accrual based earnings strategies as a supplement for each other. The 
correlations between the three aggregate RM proxies are high in a range from 0.655 to 0.911. 
This suggests that they are indicative of the RM activities and can be a substitute for each 
other. They are also highly correlated with the three individual RM measures, especially the 
correlations between RM_3 and the three individual measures are between 0.601 and 0.896. 
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This is much higher than in the US market as reported by Cohen et al. (2008).  For the three 
individual real proxies, APROD has a positive correlation with DA (Pearson correlation of 
0.09) and the aggregated RM_1 and RM_3. The correlations between ACFO and DA and 
between it and RM_2 and RM_3 are high and negative. This implies that firms attempt to 
achieve high earnings by manipulating production activities and related cash flows. 
Consistent with Firth et al. (2006), the compensation of the top three senior managers is 
positively correlated with DA, but negatively correlated with RM activities. A reverse 
relationship can be found for leverage. The number of TS has a positive correlation with RM 
but insignificant with AM. Overall, these preliminary results based on Pearson correlation are 
in line with previous studies and our expectation that Chinese firms may engage in both 
accrual-based and real earning strategies and their earnings management activities are 
correlated with firm characteristics and corporate governance features.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
To understand whether the incentive alignment effect created by the SSSREF can improve 
firms’ corporate governance in the Chinese market, we test the significance of differences in 
those corporate governance variables used in the study between pre- and post-reform regimes. 
Table 3 reports the mean values of the corporate governance variables and the results of t 
tests on the significance of the differences of the variables in the two regimes. In Table 3, we 
can find an improvement in these corporate governance proxies. For example, there is a 
significant decrease in the ownership concentration. The largest shareholders’ holding 
declined by 5% from 40% to 35%. Similarly, there is also a significant decrease in state 
ownership, which declines from 54.3% to 40.5%. For board independence and CEO duality, 
we can observe an increase and decrease in their value (percentages) in our sample 
respectively. These results indicate that the SSSREF has effectively improved the quality of 
firms’ corporate governance in China, where the environment of minority shareholder 
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protection is significantly weaker than in the developed countries. Therefore, in the 
multivariate regression model, we incorporate these variables to account for their impact on 
earnings management activities. However, the largest shareholders’ holding is still high 
compared to the standards in developed countries. Therefore, we may not expect the SSSREF 
to effectively improve the quality of financial information since the dominant shareholders 
have the incentive to manipulate earnings so as to increase their own wealth by inflating the 
share price after their NTS are converted into TS. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Main tests of hypotheses for accrual-based earnings activities 
Table 4 first reports the results of the multivariate regression analyses of the accrual-based 
earnings management behaviour in Chinese listed firms. Model 1, 2 and 3 are the regressions 
when we use RM_1, RM_2 and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies respectively. We control 
for the industry effect across all models and present the regression results with firm clustering 
standard errors. The coefficients on the aggregate RM proxies are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% percent level across all models in Table 4. This suggests that there is a 
positive association between real and accrual earnings management activities over the whole 
sample period. We interpret the results as evidence that Chinese listed firms with a higher 
level of real-based earnings management tend to engage in more accrual-based earnings 
management. The results support our H1 that Chinese listed firms exhibit a long term positive 
relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management. This may be a reflection 
of weak minority shareholder protection in China. 
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[Insert Table 4 around here] 
As discussed earlier, we postulate a decline in the level of AM activities following the 
SSSREF as a result of the incentive alignment effect between NTS and TS shareholders. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find a significantly negative coefficient on the SSSREF 
across all three models in Table 4. This suggests that after the reform, firms reduced their AM 
activities, although they may also engage more in RM simultaneously (see further discussion 
in 4.2). This finding is consistent with our H2 and indicates that accrual-based earnings 
management in emerging markets with weak corporate governance mechanisms and weak 
investor protection can be effectively constrained by improving firms’ incentive alignment 
rather than their accounting reporting rules directly. The results are similar to the findings of 
Cohen et al. (2008) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) that there is a significant decrease in AM 
on the passing of the SOX and mandatory adoption of the IFRS in developed markets. The 
main distinction between the findings of Cohen et al. (2008) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) 
and this paper is that the SSSREF has created an incentive alignment effect rather than 
imposing a direct comprehensive regulatory change in firms’ reporting practices and related 
corporate policies. Moreover, unlike the SOX and IFRS reforms, the SSSREF took place in a 
market with weak corporate governance and investor protection. It however has exhibited a 
similar effect on constraining firms’ AM activities. H3 predicts a shift from AM to RM after 
the reform. Consistent with this conjecture, we find a negative and significant coefficient on 
RM*SSSREF across all regressions with different RM proxies. This empirical evidence 
indicates that the positive relationship between RM and AM is reduced after the reform and 
this may be because firms are more likely to replace AM with less detectable and scrutinised 
RM activities after the reform.  
The results in Table 4 are robust to the control of corporate governance variables, firm 
characteristics, and the industry effect. Discretionary accruals are significantly negatively 
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associated with the number of tradable shares (TS) while the coefficient on the salary of top 
management (PAY) is significant and positive. The significant negative coefficient on TS is 
similar to the finding of Cohen and Zarowin (2010). It implies the larger the number of 
tradable shares, the greater the monitoring effects from minority shareholders. Additionally, 
the cost of earnings management to improve earnings per share depends on the number of 
tradable shares. The positive coefficient on PAY implies that top managers are more likely to 
assist the use of discretionary accruals as their salary is closely linked to reported earnings. 
Our results on firm characteristics also indicate that large firms (FIRMSIZE) or firms with 
lower book to market ratio (BM), lower leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), and higher Tobin’s Q 
(TOBINQ) are more likely to have a high tendency to manage accruals.  
 
4.2 Main tests of hypotheses for real earnings management  
Table 5 presents the results of the effects of the SSSREF on firms’ real earning management 
behaviour. We estimate the regression Eq (10) with three aggregate RM proxies as the 
dependent variables in model 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Consistent with our prediction in H1, 
the empirical results in both Table 4 and 5 indicate a positive and significant association 
between real and accrual-based earnings management (at the 0.01 level). The DA coefficients 
in Table 5 are all positive and significant for all aggregate RM proxies. The magnitude of the 
DA coefficient is the greatest when using the measure of RM_3 which is the combination of 
ACFO, APROD and ADISX, and it is the smallest for RM_1. This result of the RM activities 
further confirms H1 and our finding drawn from the AM behaviours discussed in 4.1 that 
there is a positive relationship between RM and AM in Chinese listed firms over the whole 
sample period. Together with the results in Table 4, these show that Chinese listed firms 
when engaging in either more real or accrual-based earnings management are more likely to 
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also use the other method to supplement it. Again, this may result from the lack of corporate 
governance and weak investor protection in China. 
 [Insert Table 5 around here] 
Different from our analysis for AM in Table 4, the signs of the SSSREF coefficients with 
three aggregate RM proxies as dependent variables are all positive and significant at the 0.01 
level. This implies the increasing use of RM to manage earnings after the reform.  Together 
with the result obtained for AM in Table 4, which shows a significantly negative SSSREF 
coefficient, the above finding provides additional evidence to support our H2 that Chinese 
listed firms use more RM and less AM after the reform.  More importantly, the coefficient on 
the interactive term between DA and SSSREF dummy is significantly negative for all the 
aggregate RM proxies. These imply that firms are more likely to switch from AM to RM 
activities after the reform and thus support our H3. Although previous studies indicate that 
the quantity of firms’ information and incentive alignment for profit maximisation have been 
improved through the reform, our results show that the earning quality has not been 
fundamentally changed, and this may be caused by high ownership concentration after the 
SSSREF. Firms take advantage of the dynamic relationship between the two earnings 
strategies to avoid detection and scrutiny by the capital market and regulators.    
The coefficient estimates on our control variables in Table 5 have the opposite signs to those 
from the regressions with DA as the dependent variables in Table 4. This lends further 
support to the consistence of our analysis. Taking into account the results presented in Table 
4, our results indicate top managers with higher salaries tend to use more AM rather than RM. 
The positive and significant coefficients on TOP1 in Table 5 implies that ownership 
concentration are more likely to allow controlling shareholders to engage in more RM and 
camouflage their expropriation of the value of minority shareholders. Moreover, the 
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significantly negative BIG4 coefficient in Table 5 also indicates firms are less likely to 
manipulate real earnings given the presence of the international Big 4 audit firms or their 
joint ventures. In contrast to our results for accruals, the aggregate RM is lower in large firms 
(FIRMSIZE) or in firms with lower BM, lower LEVERAGE, and higher TOBINQ.  Moreover, 
we also observe that firms with more tradable shares (TS) prefer to use more RM as AM is 
more likely to be detected.       
To sum up, as discussed in section 2, previous research suggests the reform has improved the 
incentive alignment exogenously between NTS and TS shareholders. Both now focus on 
improving firms’ performance for profit maximisation as the stock held by NTS controlling 
shareholders becomes tradable and linked to stock performance. They may have the incentive 
to supply information to reap the benefits of market-based capital allocation and to avoid 
adverse stock pricing. The need for controlling shareholders to withhold or manipulate stock 
price sensitive information should also be reduced (Hou et al., 2012).  
However, controlling shareholders may be tempted to increase wealth by inflating stock 
prices in the post-reform period. This is highly likely to be the case as Chinese listed firms 
still display high ownership concentration after the SSSREF. As firms’ operating 
performance cannot be improved overnight, they are more likely to turn to manipulating 
accounting performance and camouflage their intentions for expropriation. Our results imply 
that firms choose to switch from AM to RM activities as the costs of manipulating accruals 
increase with the heightened scrutiny by the capital market after the reform. This finding is 
consistent with the results of Zang (2012), who suggest that managers treat the RM and AM 
earnings management strategies as substitutes. Table 4 and 5 show that similar to the direct 
regulatory changes of SOX and IFRS in developed markets with strengthened investor 
protection, the incentive alignment brought by the SSSREF has a positive impact on Chinese 
listed firms’ earnings behaviour in terms of the accrual based earnings management. 
32 
 
However, it is not sufficient enough to fundamentally improve the quality of their financial 
information as the dominant shareholders still retain a large share ownership even though the 
shareholdings of the largest shareholders and state ownership are significantly reduced.
13
   
 
4.3 Robustness Checks  
4.3.1 Individual real earnings proxies  
We also estimate Eq (9) using three individual real earnings proxies, ACFO, APROD and 
ADISX when the dependent variable is DA, and compare the results with those in Table 4.
 14
 
The results are similar to those in Table 4 and support the predictions of our three main 
hypotheses. The negative coefficients on ACFO and ADISX and positive coefficient on 
APROD are all significant at the 0.01 level indicating a positive relationship between RM and 
AM activities. This is because a higher APROD and a lower ACFO and ADISX indicate the 
use of real earning management as discussed in section 3.1.2. Furthermore, the coefficients 
on SSSREF remain negative, and the interaction terms of SSSREF*ACFO, and 
SSSREF*ADISX are significantly positive. These further confirm the prediction that firms 
shift from AM to RM after the reform that we present in Table 4. For the two sets of control 
variables we find significant in Table 4, the signs and magnitude of the coefficients and the 
level of their significance remain consistent. 
Similarly, we replicate our analysis of Table 5 by replacing the aggregate RM proxies with 
their three components. The results still support our hypotheses and are similar to those in 
Tables 5. Consistent with H1, the coefficient on DAs for ACFO and ADISX are significant 
and negative and APROD are significantly positive, indicating a positive relationship 
between DA and individual RM proxies. The coefficients on SSSREF are significant and have 
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similar signs as the above, implying a greater use of RM after the reform and support our H2. 
The positive coefficients on DA* SSSREF for ACFO and ADISX show a significant reduction 
in the long-term positive association between AM and RM after the reform and further 
confirm our H3.   
 
4.3.2 Accounting flexibility  
Previous studies suggest that managers do not have unlimited discretion to manipulate 
earnings upwards due to the reversing nature of accrual accounting and the flexibility within 
firms’ internal accounting systems. The extent to which firms manage earnings is constrained 
by their accounting choices in previous periods, and the net asset values on the balance sheet 
reflect the level of past earnings management (Barton & Simko, 2002). Firms with higher 
level of overstated net assets relative to sales will have less ability to engage in further 
accruals management. Wang and D'Souza (2006) build on this research and show that firms 
are more likely to engage in real earnings manipulation through reducing R&D expenditure 
when accounting flexibility is low. We follow Barton and Simko (2002) and use the net 
operating assets scaled by sales at the beginning of the year to proxy for accounting 
flexibility. We then incorporate the accounting flexibility proxy and its interactive term with 
SSSREF in equations (11) and (12) to test whether our empirical results on earnings 
management are induced by the changes in accounting flexibility or by the effect of the split 
share structure reform. We estimate the following two regressions:  
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19
_ _
1 4
_ _
DA SSSREF BSC BSC SSSREF RM PROXY SSSREF RM PROXY
DUALITY BIND PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
       
     
       
       
     
 (11) 
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19
_
1 4
_ _
RM PROXY SSSREF BSC BSC SSSREF DA SSSREF DA
DUALITY BIND PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
       
     
       
       
     
    (12)
 
where the dependent variable is either discretionary accruals (DA) in equation (11) or the 
aggregate real proxies in equation (12). For the independent variables, BSC is computed by 
the ratio of the firm’s 1 1/t tNOA Sales  . We then divided this ratio by its corresponding 
industry median value to account for its high dependence on industry (Defond, 2002). All 
other variables are defined previously.  
Similar to the findings of Wang and D'Souza (2006), Barton and Simko (2002) and Zang 
(2012), our results show that the BSC coefficient has a significant and negative correlation 
with accruals.
15
 This indicates firms with low accounting flexibility tend to have a lower level 
of discretionary accruals. Its coefficients with the aggregate real earning proxies are positive 
and significant. These results imply that firms are more likely to use more real earnings 
manipulation when the option of using accruals is constrained by a lower level of accounting 
flexibility. However, the coefficients on the interactive term between BSC and SSSREF are 
all insignificant when DA is used as the dependent variable, while they are significantly 
positive when RM is employed as the dependent variable. These results suggest that the 
changes in accounting flexibility have a similar effect on accrual-based earnings 
manipulation both before and after the reform. A decrease in accounting flexibility is more 
likely to induce a higher level of real earnings management, and this was seen to increase 
after the reform.  
After controlling for the effect of accounting flexibility, the results for our main hypotheses 
are consistent with our previous findings that there is a positive long-term relationship 
between the accrual and real activities, in the post-reform period the use of discretionary 
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accruals declines while real earnings management activities increase, and the positive 
relationship between the two is reduced after the reform. All signs of the control variables 
remain unchanged and the variations in their magnitudes are all small. 
 
4.3.3 Difference-in-difference design 
We employ the difference-in-difference design and separate the sample firms into two groups 
with and without non-tradable shares so as to compare them under the same market 
conditions. For the group of firms without non-tradable shares, the reform would not improve 
the incentive alignment between shareholders and they are treated as the control group. We 
do not expect changes in their earnings management activities. Contrarily, the group of firms 
with non-tradable shares is the treatment group, and we expect the SSSREF to have a 
significant effect on their earnings management behaviours.  
[Insert Table 6 and 7 around here] 
Table 6 reports the results when we regress the DA on the SSSREF dummy, real earnings 
proxies, the interaction term between these two, and the same set of control variables used in 
our main tests.
16
 Consistent with our expectation, Table 6 shows that for the treatment group 
the coefficients on SSSREF are still significantly negative. This indicates that DA is lower 
after the reform. Furthermore, the RM coefficient is still positive and significant, while the 
interaction term coefficient is still significantly negative. This shows that the long-term 
positive relationship between DA and RM is lower after the reform. These results imply that 
these firms shift from DA to the less detectable RM activities. These are in line with our main 
results in Table 4. On the contrary, for the control group, both the SSSREF and the 
interaction term coefficients are insignificant. This implies that the SSSREF has no impact on 
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the control group (firms without non-tradable shares) as they are not affected by the 
aforementioned incentive alignment effect. In Table 7, we can also find that the SSSREF has 
an impact on the treatment group and not the control group when we regress the real earnings 
on the three main explanatory variables and the same set of control variables.
17
  
 
4.3.4 The suspect firm analysis  
To test whether those proxies capture firms’ earnings activities, we follow Cohen’s et al. 
(2008) suspect firm analysis using incentive variables proposed by Roychowdhury (2006) 
and Graham et al. (2005). We construct two groups of suspect firms from the sample since 
they may be more likely to adopt earnings management according to these benchmarks: one 
for firms that managed their earnings to avoid reporting a loss, and the other for those that 
managed their earnings to maintain the same level as or slightly higher than the prior year’s 
earnings. For the former group, we consider those firms which have the value of net income 
divided by total assets in the interval [0, 0.005), while for the latter, we include those firms 
with a change in net income divided by total assets in the interval [0, 0.005). The results are 
reported in Table 8. It is apparent that firms in these two suspect groups manifest significant 
changes in their AM and RM. Consistent with our main hypothesis, the accrual earnings 
management activities are significantly reduced after the SSSREF. RM increased 
significantly after the reform as shown in all three alternative measures. This suspect firm 
analysis further confirms our main results and demonstrates that those firms which engaged 
in earnings management shifted from AM to RM after the reform. 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
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4.3.5 The market wide reform effect  
As described in section 2, the CSRC made the split share reform announcement and 
conducted a policy pilot in 2005. It also made a specific timeline for the majority of the firms 
to complete the reform. Hou et al. (2012) suggest that firms would start preparing for the 
reform and instruct managers to focus on share return performance before the firm was 
actually chosen to start the NTS share conversion process in a different time period, and thus 
the reform may have a market wide effect. In our regression equations 9 - 12, we replace the 
firm level reform variable with the market wide reform variable which takes the value of 1 
from 2006 onwards. The results show that our findings are robust and consistent.
18
 This 
implies that the effects of the reform on firms’ earnings management activities, and the 
relationship between the real and accrual earnings management are not exclusive to either the 
firm or market level.    
 
4.3.6 Sensitivity tests 
We conduct a number of sensitivity tests to further check the robustness of our empirical 
results shown in previous tables. Firstly, following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) and 
Cohen et al. (2008), we employ the alternative modified Jones model and compute the 
discretionary accruals with the denominator in the second term of  the equation (3) to be 
replaced with the difference between the changes in sales revenue and changes in account 
receivables. Our findings still remain unchanged. Secondly, we exclude firms with IPOs after 
2005 since these firms have no NTS to convert in the post reform period. We find similar 
results and the magnitudes of the coefficients on our main independent variables are even 
higher, showing a stronger impact of the reform. Thirdly, we consider an additional 
confounding effect of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
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Standards (IFRS) in China. This requirement for all listed firms might partially influence the 
impact of the SSSREF on earnings management. In the multivariate regression analysis, our 
results are materially unchanged after controlling for the impact of the adoption of IFRS.
19
 
Fourthly, we add another two control variables, changes in GDP and changes in sales, as they 
might indicate the changes in the market-wide condition and firms’ performance, and the 
results are still consistent.  Furthermore, ROE can indicate firms’ incentive for earnings 
manipulation to meet regulatory requirements for listing or right issues (Ding et al., 2007). 
Similar results are also found when replacing ROA with ROE. The results of these sensitivity 
tests corroborate the empirical results presented in Table 3-8.
20
 In addition, we apply the 
bootstrapped medium regressions to eliminate the influence of outliers and the results remain 
materially unchanged. Finally, we estimate the regressions with time trend, and the results are 
consistent with our main hypotheses. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the impact of the 
SSSREF on firms’ real and accrual-based earnings behaviours in China. The distinctive 
settings of the SSSREF allow us to draw new inferences. Firstly, this study is conducted in an 
emerging country context with weak investor protection. Secondly, the exogeneity of 
incentive alignment effect given by China’s split share structure reform allows us to compare 
the results with previous studies looking at the impact of the direct regulatory changes in 
accounting reporting rules such as SOX and IFRS on earnings management in developed 
markets where corporate governance mechanisms and investor protection are stronger. 
We also contribute to the earnings management literature by providing empirical results on 
the relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management activities before and 
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after the SSSREF. Our results delineate a long-term positive relationship between the two 
earnings management activities throughout our sample period from 2002 to 2011. This may 
result from the weaker environment for investor protection in China than developed countries. 
The Chinese SSSREF has strengthened firms’ incentive alignment exogenously as the 
interest and wealth of NTS shareholders are linked to firms’ stock performance after the 
reform. Therefore, the SSSREF is distinguished from the SOX and IFRS in that it does not 
impose a direct comprehensive regulatory change in firms’ accounting reporting practice. It is 
of interest that our result show a tendency for firms to use more real and less accrual based 
earnings management in the post reform period and the long term positive relationship 
between the two earnings activities is significantly reduced.  
These suggest that firms, while continuing to employ both earnings methods, may have 
shifted their focus from accruals to real earnings activities to avoid detection and scrutiny by 
the capital market after the reform. Although previous studies show that the incentive 
alignment effect created by the reform has improved the quantity of financial information, 
our results suggest that it may not fundamentally and automatically increase the quality of the 
earnings information that firms make progressively available to the market. This may be 
because dominant shareholders still maintain large shareholdings after the reform. Our results 
thus suggest that the reform has an exogenous effect on firms’ earnings behaviours in a 
country with weak investor protection.  
The key policy implication from this paper is in an emerging market context, policy design 
which improves the incentive alignment can have a similar effect to a direct regulatory 
change in accounting reporting rules in effectively constraining the use of discretionary 
accruals in developed country markets. At the same time, our findings provide a vital caveat 
for researchers, investors, and regulators when they interpret the increasingly wide-spread 
availability to market participants of information either induced by legal requirements or 
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voluntary disclosure as a reduction of manipulation of earnings information. Firms’ operating 
performance cannot be improved overnight, whilst desired accounting performance can be 
achieved through earnings manipulation in a short period. As the incentive alignment has led 
the controlling shareholders to focus on stock performance, such incentives for earnings 
manipulation may increase.  
Firms may simply shift the focus of earnings management to less detectable real activities 
that can be costly and difficult to monitor for outside investors. Increasing scrutiny or costs 
for accounting discretion does not eradicate earnings management activities, but merely alters 
controlling shareholders’ preference for different earnings management strategies that 
camouflage their expropriation of minority shareholders. Investors need to consider these 
earnings behaviours as additional risks when making investment decisions. In emerging 
markets such as China, protecting minority shareholders does not simply stop at increasing 
firms’ information quantity. Regulators need to be aware of both forms of earnings activity, 
and tackle such opportunistic behaviours by introducing mechanisms that curb the power of 
controlling shareholders. Our study represents an important extension to the current literature 
on the earnings management behaviours in fast growing emerging markets like China.   
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      Table 1: Sample and summary statistics 
      Panel A. Annual number of firm observation 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Observations 1,048 1,117 1,198 1,293 1,285 1,320 1,432 1,524 1,620 2,003 
 
      Panel B. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
50
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile 
DA 13840 0.001 0.092 -0.045 0.003 0.049 
RM_1 12610 -0.005 0.159 -0.086 0.013 0.094 
RM_2 13602 0.007 0.111 -0.059 0.012 0.076 
RM_3 12610 -0.003 0.205 -0.113 0.013 0.123 
ACFO 13840 -0.003 0.095 -0.054 -0.002 0.052 
APROD 12831 -0.010 0.128 -0.070 0.000 0.058 
ADISX 13602 -0.003 0.064 -0.045 -0.014 0.023 
BSC 13196 1.376 1.306 0.565 1.000 1.676 
SSSREF 13840 0.468 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TOP1 13840 0.380 0.161 0.254 0.358 0.502 
PAY 13840 13.372 0.928 12.780 13.430 13.998 
BIND 13840 0.348 0.062 0.333 0.333 0.372 
DUALITY 13840 0.152 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIG4 13840 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STATE 13840 0.479 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TS 13840 19.012 1.067 18.264 18.915 19.619 
LEVERAGE 13840 0.522 0.290 0.353 0.507 0.645 
TOBINQ 13840 2.268 1.711 1.257 1.727 2.602 
ROA 13838 0.036 0.596 0.010 0.033 0.063 
BM 13840 0.377 0.279 0.200 0.338 0.525 
FIRMSIZE 13840 21.457 1.177 20.676 21.338 22.107 
IPO_DUM 13840 0.142 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ST_DUM 13840 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. 
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Table 2 Correlation matrix 
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DA 1 
                      
RM_1 0.106 1 
                     
RM_2 0.492 0.655 1 
                    
RM_3 0.309 0.911 0.871 1 
                   
ACFO -0.540 -0.331 -0.844 -0.681 1 
                  
APROD 0.090 0.943 0.573 0.896 -0.399 1 
                 
ADISX -0.103 -0.734 -0.587 -0.601 0.081 -0.484 1 
                
BSC -0.043 0.097 0.065 0.084 -0.020 0.081 -0.093 1 
               
SSSREF -0.012 0.002 0.031 0.012 -0.023 -0.005 -0.015 0.037 1 
              
TOP1 0.068 0.030 0.003 0.014 0.022 0.022 -0.035 -0.129 -0.153 1 
             
PAY 0.107 -0.153 -0.088 -0.131 0.024 -0.135 0.129 -0.144 0.345 -0.067 1 
            
BIND 0.003 -0.011 0.025 0.004 -0.030 -0.014 -0.001 0.018 0.256 -0.072 0.207 1 
           
DUALITY 0.004 -0.055 -0.034 -0.047 0.005 -0.047 0.048 0.016 -0.010 -0.091 0.030 0.062 1 
          
BIG4 0.019 -0.032 -0.046 -0.038 0.027 -0.023 0.045 -0.059 -0.078 0.088 0.117 -0.031 -0.037 1 
         
STATE 0.005 0.071 -0.004 0.045 0.027 0.078 -0.030 -0.058 -0.174 0.310 -0.144 -0.159 -0.116 0.081 1 
        
TS -0.013 0.044 0.043 0.043 -0.019 0.032 -0.047 0.017 0.420 -0.043 0.438 0.170 -0.049 0.204 -0.092 1 
       
LEVERAGE -0.250 0.120 0.102 0.149 -0.130 0.164 0.003 -0.073 0.022 -0.107 -0.118 0.036 0.003 -0.049 -0.057 -0.028 1 
      
TOBINQ -0.020 -0.206 -0.159 -0.210 0.124 -0.214 0.117 0.016 0.158 -0.114 -0.011 0.051 0.084 -0.060 -0.164 -0.096 0.111 1 
     
ROA 0.231 -0.111 -0.076 -0.144 0.135 -0.174 -0.052 -0.134 0.073 0.057 0.189 0.040 -0.022 0.035 -0.013 0.084 -0.270 0.072 1 
    
BM 0.116 0.161 0.120 0.147 -0.050 0.135 -0.149 0.012 -0.170 0.137 0.007 -0.015 -0.077 0.053 0.183 0.118 -0.398 -0.591 0.083 1 
   
FIRMSIZE 0.072 0.081 0.047 0.075 -0.031 0.086 -0.033 -0.101 0.216 0.238 0.454 0.081 -0.103 0.235 0.117 0.732 -0.034 -0.402 0.130 0.342 1 
  
IPO_DUM 0.076 -0.059 -0.025 -0.049 0.004 -0.058 0.039 -0.064 -0.226 0.064 0.013 -0.016 0.065 -0.015 -0.019 -0.232 -0.135 0.017 0.045 0.014 -0.085 1 
 
ST_DUM -0.065 0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.061 0.012 -0.027 -0.144 0.029 0.050 -0.040 -0.037 -0.098 0.173 0.133 0.016 -0.170 -0.198 -0.074 1 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
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Table 3 The difference in corporate governance between pre- and post-reform regimes 
Variable Pre-reform Post-reform 
Difference 
(post-pre) P value  
TOP1 0.403 0.354 -0.050 0.000 
PAY 13.105 13.674 0.568 0.000 
BIND 0.335 0.362 0.027 0.000 
DUALITY 0.165 0.137 -0.028 0.000 
BIG4 0.078 0.061 -0.017 0.000 
STATE 0.543 0.405 -0.138 0.000 
TS 18.588 19.492 0.904 0.000 
      Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. 
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Table 4 The impact of the SSSREM on accrual-based earnings management (DA) with 
aggregate real earnings proxies 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SSSREF -0.005** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 
(-2.340) (-3.992) (-3.892) 
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.032** -0.094*** -0.049*** 
 
(-2.568) (-6.150) (-5.015) 
RM_PROXY 0.123*** 0.522*** 0.215*** 
 
(12.174) (40.869) (25.422) 
TOP1 -0.004 -0.010* -0.006 
 
(-0.640) (-1.673) (-0.915) 
PAY 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 
(6.539) (9.475) (9.092) 
IND 0.012 -0.012 0.006 
 
(0.810) (-0.897) (0.382) 
DUALITY 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.528) (0.641) (0.965) 
BIG4 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 
 
(-1.255) (0.721) (-0.425) 
STATE -0.005*** -0.001 -0.005** 
 
(-2.644) (-0.368) (-2.554) 
TS -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
(-11.219) (-14.390) (-12.612) 
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.107*** -0.112*** 
 
(-22.255) (-25.815) (-24.394) 
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(6.236) (11.082) (9.697) 
ROA 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 
(0.635) (1.444) (0.714) 
BM -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 
 
(-7.915) (-9.879) (-10.409) 
FIRMSIZE 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 
(9.893) (12.114) (10.716) 
IPO_DUM 0.002 -0.006*** 0.001 
 
(0.805) (-2.835) (0.182) 
ST_DUM -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(-0.866) (-0.436) (-0.776) 
Intercept -0.081*** -0.111*** -0.097*** 
 
(-3.482) (-4.947) (-4.145) 
R-squared 0.119 0.401 0.245 
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variable is DA. Model 1, 2 and 3 are the regressions when we use RM_1, RM_2 and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies respectively. We use industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial 
codes. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 The impact of the SSSREM on aggregate real earnings management proxies 
(aggregate RM) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SSSREF 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.030*** 
 
(4.869) (5.598) (5.545) 
DA*SSSREF -0.110*** -0.160*** -0.155*** 
 
(-2.972) (-7.680) (-3.680) 
DA 0.366*** 0.800*** 0.992*** 
 
(13.927) (57.392) (33.441) 
TOP1 0.023 0.018* 0.024 
 
(1.274) (1.860) (1.151) 
PAY -0.034*** -0.016*** -0.039*** 
 
(-11.054) (-9.679) (-10.626) 
IND 0.014 0.034* 0.035 
 
(0.434) (1.784) (0.903) 
DUALITY -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 
 
(-1.414) (-1.284) (-1.434) 
BIG4 -0.018 -0.015** -0.024* 
 
(-1.541) (-2.353) (-1.722) 
STATE 0.009* -0.004 0.007 
 
(1.944) (-1.518) (1.284) 
TS 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.037*** 
 
(5.126) (10.402) (7.393) 
LEVERAGE 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.220*** 
 
(11.855) (20.302) (17.434) 
TOBINQ -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.029*** 
 
(-10.801) (-14.155) (-13.425) 
ROA -0.002 -0.007** -0.005 
 
(-0.530) (-2.192) (-0.823) 
BM 0.072*** 0.040*** 0.097*** 
 
(10.451) (9.732) (11.574) 
FIRMSIZE -0.009* -0.019*** -0.026*** 
 
(-1.958) (-8.008) (-4.909) 
IPO_DUM 0.004 0.018*** 0.012* 
 
(0.768) (5.761) (1.781) 
ST_DUM 0.009 -0.001 0.004 
 
(1.247) (-0.359) (0.508) 
Intercept 0.119* 0.127*** 0.186** 
 
(1.858) (3.544) (2.467) 
R-squared 0.143 0.387 0.264 
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are aggregate RM proxies.  Model 1, 2 and 3 are the regressions when we use RM_1, RM_2 and RM_3 as 
the aggregate RM proxies respectively. We use industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the 
CSRC industrial codes. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Difference in difference design for the accrual based earning management (DA) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
SSSREF -0.004* 0.004 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.002 
 
(-1.701) (0.772) (-3.231) (-0.247) (-3.239) (0.402) 
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.035*** 0.014 -0.092*** 0.087* -0.052*** 0.044 
 
(-2.666) (0.384) (-5.613) (1.925) (-5.054) (1.496) 
RM_PROXY 0.124*** 0.088*** 0.527*** 0.339*** 0.217*** 0.131*** 
 
(12.032) (2.608) (40.415) (8.430) (25.122) (4.688) 
TOP1 -0.000 -0.026 -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 -0.020 
 
(-0.011) (-1.645) (-1.026) (-1.348) (-0.338) (-1.326) 
PAY 0.009*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.008** 
 
(6.509) (1.463) (9.482) (2.286) (8.981) (2.296) 
IND 0.021 -0.053 -0.008 -0.058 0.012 -0.047 
 
(1.306) (-1.223) (-0.576) (-1.386) (0.784) (-1.109) 
DUALITY -0.001 0.016** -0.000 0.015** 0.001 0.015** 
 
(-0.276) (2.420) (-0.163) (2.403) (0.185) (2.455) 
BIG4 -0.004 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
 
(-1.061) (-1.180) (0.880) (-0.521) (-0.321) (-0.623) 
STATE -0.007*** 0.066 -0.003 0.049 -0.007*** 0.048 
 
(-3.154) (0.956) (-1.590) (1.528) (-3.289) (0.980) 
TS -0.020*** -0.004 -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.008* 
 
(-10.484) (-0.868) (-12.637) (-3.177) (-11.495) (-1.898) 
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.104*** -0.124*** -0.111*** -0.116*** 
 
(-21.012) (-8.117) (-24.197) (-11.799) (-23.362) (-10.126) 
TOBINQ 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 
(5.538) (2.596) (10.150) (4.562) (8.865) (3.668) 
ROA 0.001 0.088*** 0.004 0.102** 0.002 0.110*** 
 
(0.596) (2.923) (1.456) (2.174) (0.677) (2.639) 
BM -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.052*** 
 
(-7.275) (-3.006) (-9.091) (-3.912) (-9.608) (-4.067) 
FIRMSIZE 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 
 
(8.976) (3.265) (11.064) (4.280) (9.805) (3.545) 
IPO_DUM 0.002 _ -0.006*** _ 0.000 _ 
 
(0.565) 
 
(-2.752) 
 
(0.028) 
 ST_DUM -0.005 0.009 -0.003 0.010 -0.004 0.007 
 
(-1.182) (0.621) (-0.780) (0.874) (-1.023) (0.570) 
Intercept -0.082*** -0.252*** -0.092*** -0.147** -0.118*** -0.189*** 
 
(-3.261) (-3.772) (-3.964) (-2.423) (-4.684) (-2.994) 
R-squared 0.123 0.111 0.412 0.339 0.251 0.228 
Observations 11,019 1,505 11,896 1,506 11,019 1,505 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variable is DA.  Model 1, 2 and 3 are the regressions when we use RM_1, RM_2 and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies respectively. We use industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial 
codes. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Difference in difference design for real based earning management (RM) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
Non- 
tradable Tradable 
SSSREF 0.022*** -0.008 0.013*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.004 
 
(4.914) (-0.403) (5.132) (0.383) (5.394) (0.154) 
DA*SSSREF -0.110*** -0.213 -0.157*** -0.126 -0.161*** -0.189 
 
(-2.849) (-1.431) (-7.139) (-1.055) (-3.603) (-1.086) 
DA 0.359*** 0.520*** 0.797*** 0.786*** 0.985*** 1.100*** 
 
(13.550) (3.941) (57.458) (6.477) (33.106) (6.393) 
TOP1 0.026 0.001 0.017* -0.001 0.026 -0.017 
 
(1.385) (0.023) (1.676) (-0.044) (1.221) (-0.360) 
PAY -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.039*** -0.033*** 
 
(-10.885) (-3.700) (-9.699) (-2.909) (-10.388) (-3.566) 
IND 0.024 -0.024 0.037** 0.043 0.047 0.001 
 
(0.755) (-0.249) (1.964) (0.665) (1.217) (0.006) 
DUALITY -0.010 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -0.006 
 
(-1.562) (0.257) (-1.072) (-0.566) (-1.385) (-0.353) 
BIG4 -0.015 -0.040** -0.015** -0.017 -0.021 -0.046* 
 
(-1.224) (-1.993) (-2.180) (-1.291) (-1.437) (-1.778) 
STATE 0.011** 0.109*** -0.001 0.018 0.011* 0.105* 
 
(2.096) (5.507) (-0.194) (0.382) (1.884) (1.698) 
TS 0.019*** 0.024** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 
 
(4.340) (2.289) (8.519) (5.058) (6.250) (3.258) 
LEVERAGE 0.111*** 0.180*** 0.108*** 0.160*** 0.212*** 0.282*** 
 
(11.109) (7.006) (19.141) (12.125) (16.809) (9.507) 
TOBINQ -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 
(-10.590) (-3.714) (-13.569) (-5.428) (-13.160) (-4.351) 
ROA -0.001 -0.205* -0.006** -0.117 -0.004 -0.303* 
 
(-0.480) (-1.941) (-2.257) (-1.223) (-0.796) (-1.781) 
BM 0.068*** 0.122*** 0.038*** 0.064*** 0.091*** 0.163*** 
 
(9.456) (6.476) (8.926) (4.626) (10.469) (6.297) 
FIRMSIZE -0.008* -0.009 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.017 
 
(-1.716) (-0.883) (-7.503) (-2.796) (-4.687) (-1.331) 
IPO_DUM 0.004 _ 0.017*** _ 0.011 _ 
 
(0.639) 
 
(5.241) 
 
(1.519) 
 ST_DUM 0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.006 
 
(1.081) (0.439) (-0.258) (-0.418) (0.318) (0.197) 
Intercept 0.195*** -0.045 0.134*** -0.129 0.329*** -0.213 
 
(2.868) (-0.299) (3.713) (-1.460) (4.128) (-1.169) 
R-squared 0.143 0.190 0.394 0.384 0.265 0.308 
Observations 11,019 1,505 11,896 1,506 11,019 1,505 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are aggregate RM proxies.  Model 1, 2 and 3 are the regressions when we use RM_1, RM_2 and RM_3 as 
the aggregate RM proxies respectively. We use industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the 
CSRC industrial codes. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Suspect firm analysis 
Panel A. Just Avoid 
    Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Difference (post-pre) P value  
DA 0.004 -0.010 -0.013 0.013 
RM1 0.061 0.075 0.014 0.088 
RM2  0.047 0.063 0.016 0.011 
RM3  0.079 0.111 0.032 0.003 
 
Panel B. Meet or Beat 
    Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Difference (post-pre) P value  
DA 0 .009 -0.001 -0.010 0.004 
RM1 0.011 0.027 0.016 0.025 
RM2  0.011 0.027 0.017  0.001 
RM3 0.008 0.040 0.032 0.000 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. We construct two 
groups of suspect firms from the sample since they may be more likely to adopt earnings management according to 
these benchmarks: “Just Avoid” are those firms that managed their earnings to avoid reporting a loss, and “Meet or 
Beat” are those that managed their earnings to maintain the same level as or slightly higher than the prior year’s 
earnings. For the former group, we consider those firms which have the value of net income divided by total assets 
in the interval [0, 0.005), while for the latter, we include those firms with a change in net income divided by total 
assets in the interval [0, 0.005).  
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Appendix A. Variable definition 
DA  Discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model 
RM_1  Aggregate real earnings management proxy 1, the sum of abnormal production costs and the 
additive inverse of abnormal cash flows from operations 
RM_2  Aggregate real earnings management proxy 2, the sum of the additive inverse of abnormal cash 
flows from operations and the additive inverse of abnormal discretionary expenses 
RM_3  Aggregate real earnings management proxy 3, the sum of RM_2 and abnormal production costs 
ACFO  Level of abnormal cash flows from operations 
APROD  Level of abnormal production costs, where production costs equals the sum of costs of goods sold 
and the change in inventories 
ADISX Level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D, 
advertising, selling, general and administrative expenses 
BSC Accounting flexibility calculated as the industry median adjusted ratio of the net operating assets 
over sales 
SSSREF Dummy variable equal to 1 for the period commencing a year after a listed firm was chosen to 
complete the SSSREF, 0 otherwise 
TOP1 Percentage of shareholdings held by the largest shareholder 
PAY  Natural logarithm of total compensation received by top three executives  
BIND the ratio of independent directors on the board 
DUALITY A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board and 0 otherwise 
BIG4  A dummy variable assigned to 1 if a listed firm is audited by one of the international Big Four audit 
firms or their joint ventures in China,  and 0 otherwise 
STATE  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state shareholder is the largest shareholder, and 0 otherwise 
TS  Natural logarithm of total number of  tradable shares 
LEVERAGE  Leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets 
TOBINQ  Market value of assets over book value of assets 
ROA  Return on assets: earnings before interests and tax divided by total assets. 
BM Book-to-market ratio calculated as book value of common equity over market capitalisation 
FIRMSIZE  Firm size computed as the natural logarithm of total assets 
IPO_DUM A dummy variable set to 1 for the year of IPO and the subsequent two years, and 0 otherwise 
ST_DUM  A dummy variable equal to 1 in the year in which a firm has its "special treatment" status removed 
and in the preceding year, 0 otherwise 
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1
 For example, some previous research uses empirical evidence from the US market and demonstrates that 
accruals-based earnings management can be constrained by a larger number of independent board members and 
higher quality of audit committees (Beasley 1996; Chang et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 1996; Klein 2002; Xie et al., 
2003). Hazarika et al. (2012) also show that an effective board can restrain senior managers from pursuing 
aggressive earnings strategies to manipulate accruals. Similarly, Armstrong et al. (2012) find that the passage of 
antitakeover laws in the US reinforces the external corporate governance mechanism, improving firms’ financial 
statement informativeness (see also section 2.3).  
2
 China’s listed shares (tradable) are classified into A shares for domestic investors to trade, and B, H and N shares 
for foreign investors. A shares are quoted in Chinese Yuan and B shares are quoted in foreign currencies and both 
are listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. H shares are Chinese firms’ shares listed in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. N shares are traded in the US stock markets in the form of American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs).   
3
 It has converted NTS to TS and tied the wealth of non-tradable shareholders to share prices, thereby aligning 
both tradable and non-tradable shareholders’ interests to profit maximisation. see section 2.1 for more details. 
4
 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002. 
5
 For instance, under the SOX, boards of directors and specifically audit committees need to include financial 
experts; financial reporting needs to include off-balance-sheet transactions, pro-forma figures and stock 
transactions of corporate executives. It also requires firms to report material changes in financial condition in a 
timely manner and include specific enhanced reviews by the SEC or its agents. Under the IFRS, firms are required 
to remove allowable accounting alternatives and use “fair value measurements” to report financial assets that can 
reflect their financial positions and do not affect their intrinsic value. IFRS also requires the following: recognition 
of items as assets or liabilities only in accordance with IFRS; the disclosure of the fair value measurements, 
financial instruments and financial settlements with corporate insiders or other parties; consolidated financial 
statements from the parent firms; interests of other entities included in subsidiaries, joint arrangements, or 
associations. 
6
 As previous studies indicated the reform has improved the quantity of firms’ financial information and incentive 
alignment (see section 2.3 for more details), it might be expected that Chinese listed firms have reduced their 
earnings management including both accrual and real earnings management. However, such conclusions might be 
premature. Firms may simply change their mix preferences and switch from accruals earnings management to real 
activates, which is less detectable and scrutinised, to continue manipulating accounting information in the post 
reform period. 
7
 We also use the modified Jones model in our robustness test following Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. 
(2008).  
8
 The “Enterprise Reform” (corporatisation of the state owned enterprises) in China is indeed a complicated 
process. The government adopted a piecemeal reform approach as the state still aims to influence the market. The 
primary objective of the split share structure reform is to convert non-tradable shares to tradable shares. This 
involves selling off some state owned shares and thus is considered as a privatisation process (Li et al., 2011; Liu et 
al., 2012). Following (Chang & Wong, 2009; G. Chen, Firth, & Xu, 2009; Firth et al., 2006; Huyghebaert & Wang, 
2012), the SSSREF can be considered as leading to partial privatisation since the state still retains a significant 
ownership after the firms have been listed. 
9
 Net assets per share is used as a base price for negotiation following the Promulgation of the Opinion on the 
Implementation and Regulations of the State Ownership Rights in Joint Stock Limited Companies in 1997.  Some 
recent research has reported that Chinese listed firms engaged in opportunistic earnings manipulation previous to 
IPO, using related party transactions, transfer pricing, or corporate loans. Some parent firms have been found 
using these methods to prop up the earnings of their to-be-listed subsidiaries in order to raise more capital from 
minority shareholders, and then tunnelling financial resources back in the post IPO period (Liu and Lu, 2004; Kao, 
Wu, and Yang, 2009; Aharony et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010; Liu and Tian, 2012). 
10
 Chinese listed firms often have a dominant shareholder who has substantially more shares than any other 
blockholders and has effective control (Xie et al., 2003).  
11
 Following Hovakimian (2009), we exclude the financial industry as investment in the form of capital assets varies 
significantly between financial and other industries.    
12
 Ding et al. (2007) include firms from 2001 using earnings management measures of 2002 and Gul et al. (2010) 
use a sample period from 1996 to 2003. These two sample periods are before the reform.  
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13
 We also test the changes in the Herfindahl index which is the sum of squared ownership of the top 10 
shareholders. Similarly, the result shows that Herfindahl index has significantly decreased from 0.208 to 0.162. 
14
 For brevity, the results are available upon request. 
15
 For brevity, the results are available upon request. 
16
 For consistency, we incorporate the IPO dummy in the regression for the treatment group. The IPO dummy is 
not included for the control group because its value is all zero due to the fact that the Chinese firms have non-
tradable shares within the first 36 months of their IPOs as CSRC requires firms not to trade or transfer their existing 
shares issued prior to the IPOs in this 36-month period, according to the Detailed Implementation Rules for the 
Non-public Issuance of Stocks by Listed Companies promulgated by the CSRC in 2007. When the IPO dummy is 
excluded from the regression for the treatment group, the results remain very similar. 
17
 The coefficient of the control group is -0.213 (t-stat = -0.821) for DA*SSSREF. It is larger in magnitude than the 
coefficient of the treatment group. We have thus estimated the bootstrapped coefficients. We randomly reduce 
the sample of the treatment group to be the same as the control group and repeat this procedure 1,000 times. The 
results are materially unchanged.  
18
 For brevity, the results are available upon request. 
19
 In order to control for the confounding IFRS effect, we adopted two methods. Firstly, in order to avoid the 
problem of multi-collinearity, we follow Hou et al. (2012) and include the observations between 2002 and 2007 as 
the effect of the IFRS is expected to take place from 2008. The second method we used is to incorporate an IFRS 
dummy variable which is set to one after 2007 and zero otherwise. The results are consistent and for brevity, the 
results are available upon request. 
20
 For brevity, the results are available upon request. 
